

The golden age of hacking

Covering tracks and hiding Logs Covert channels Anatomy of an attack

Covering tracks and hiding

- The majority of attacks are silent and stealthy

 Elite attackers
- Sometimes attackers don't even need to hide
- Attractive home users
- Business networks is still the major target
- Hiding evidence by altering event logs
 - All attacks leaves traces!
 - What to delete?
- Logging to central server
- Things is a lot better with Vista and later Windows OS?
 - One improvement is that Windows 2003 security logs may now record the full IP address of machines attempting a login (previously only the NetBIOS name was recorded)



Read more about logging:

http://www.loganalysis.org/

Windows event logs (pre Vista)

- Logging is underused in most Windows networks
 - The most important security log is turned off by default!
 - Mostly used when already been compromised
 - Usually a lot of data, hard to manage manually
 - http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Understanding_Windows_Logging.html
 - http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Understanding-Windows-Security-Templates.html
- Attacking event logs in Windows
 - The eventLog service produce a set of log files which ends with .LOG
 - They are periodically rewritten and event info are moved to the corresponding main log .EVT files
 - C:\WINDOWS\system32\config
 - Event viewer
 - Some MS apps have logs to

🖬 Event Viewer 📃 🗖 🔀									
File Action View Help									
Event Viewer (Local)	Security 63 376	event(s)							
Application	Туре	Date	Time	Source	Category	Event	Use		
Becurity	of Success Audit	2009-05-08	00:34:48	Security	Logon/Lo	538	hjo		
System	Success Audit	2009-05-08	00:34:48	Security	Logon/Lo	682	SY:		
📕 Internet Explorer	of Success Audit	2009-05-08	00:34:47	Security	Privilege	576	hjo		
	Success Audit	2009-05-08	00:34:47	Security	Logon/Lo	528	hjo		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:55:45	Security	Privilege	576	NE		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:55:45	Security	Logon/Lo	528	NE'		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:52:21	Security	Logon/Lo	683	SY:		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:50:35	Security	Logon/Lo	538	SY:		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:50:35	Security	Logon/Lo	540	SY:		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:50:35	Security	Privilege	576	SY:		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:42:36	Security	Privilege	576	NE.		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:42:36	Security	Logon/Lo	528	NE'		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:40:51	Security	Logon/Lo	682	SY:		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:40:51	Security	Logon/Lo	538	hjo		
	Success Audit	2009-05-07	23:40:50	Security	Privilege	576	hjo		
	<						>		
	,								

Vista/7 Event Logs

- The Windows event logs have changed dramatically in Windows Vista/7
 - A new binary XML file format is being used for the event logs with a new extension of .EVTX
- Log files are now located in
 - C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\
- There are at least 30+ different event logs that Vista/7 report events to periodically
- Events can be forwarded and collected via subscriptions

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc766042%28WS.10%29.asp x

EVTX documentation and Perl parser

http://computer.forensikblog.de/en/topics/windows/vista_event_log

Name
Application.evtx
DFS Replication.evtx
HardwareEvents.evtx
Internet Explorer.evtx
Key Management Service.evtx
Media Center.evtx
Microsoft-Windows-BitLocker-DrivePrepara
Microsoft-Windows-BitLocker-DrivePrepara
Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client%4Operation
Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity%4Operation
Microsoft-Windows-Diagnosis-DPS%4Oper
Microsoft-Windows-Diagnosis-PLA%4Opera
Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-Performance
Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-Use
Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy%4Operati
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-WHEA.evtx
Microsoft-Windows-LanguagePackSetup%
Microsoft-Windows-MUI%4Operational.ev
Microsoft-Windows-NetworkAccessProtecti
Microsoft-Windows-ReadyBoost%4Operati
Microsoft-Windows-ReliabilityAnalysisComp
Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-D
Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-F
Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Leak-Diagno:
Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager%40p

Vista/7 Event Viewer

Event Log Files (*.evtx;*.evt;* Event Log Files (*.evtx;*.evt;*.etl) Event Files (*.evtx) Legacy Event Files (*.evt) Trace Log files (*.etl)

Event Viewer							
File Action View Help							
🗢 🔿 🙍 🖬 🚺							
 Image: Subscriptions 	5 604 Events Level Warning Frror Warning Frror Kwarning Frror Ceneral Detail Your compute the Network (Date and Time 2009-05-08 09:50:53 2009-05-08 09:50:50 2009-05-07 21:43:25 2009-05-07 21:32:15 2009-05-07 18:06:42 2009-05-07 18:06:42 2009-05-07 18:06:42	Dhcp-C Service Dhcp-C Service Di C	7011 No 1000 (10 1003 No 7011 No 1002 No network (fro e following	one one one one one one x		 Create Custom View Import Custom View Filter Current Custo Properties Find Save Events in Custo Export Custom View Copy Custom View Attach Task To This View Refresh
	Event ID:	1003	Task Cat		None	E	vent 1003, Dhcp-Client 🔺
	Level:	Warning	Keyword		Classic		Event Properties
	User:	N/A	Compute	e <u>r</u> :	hjo-lar		🕑 Attach Task To This
	OpCode:	Info			+	E	🚡 Сору 🔸
Categories		Log e	ntries		•	6	Save Selected Events

Altering event logs

- Altering Windows logs not easily possible on a live system
 - Binary format, owned and locked by Eventlog service
 - Stop Eventlog service, edit with proper access rights and special tools
 - Or boot from CD (physical access) writing correct binary format
 - Winzapper (NT/W2K) or not public available tools?
 - http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1726
- Altering Linux/Unix logs
 - /etc/syslog.conf (syslogd) tells where the logs are located (/var/log)
 - ASCII format any text editor will do it
 - Need root or the same privilege as the daemon writing the log
 - Done by hand or by script
- utmp, wtmp, btmp and lastlog (w, who, last, lastb, lastlog, etc.)
 - Are binary files (utmp structure), lastlog may be distribution specific
 - http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/UNIX/penetration/log-wipers/

utmp.h structure (Ubuntu 9.04)

struct utmp {

```
short ut type; /* Type of record */
  pid t ut pid; /* PID of login process */
  char ut line[UT LINESIZE]; /* Device name of tty - "/dev/" */
                        /* Terminal name suffix, or inittab(5) ID */
  char ut id[4]:
  char ut user[UT NAMESIZE]; /* Username */
  char ut host[UT HOSTSIZE]; /* Hostname for remote login, or kernel version for run-level messages */
  struct exit status ut exit; /* Exit status of a process marked as DEAD PROCESS;
               not used by Linux init(8) */
  /* The ut session and ut tv fields must be the same size when compiled 32- and 64-bit.
   This allows data files and shared memory to be shared between 32- and 64-bit applications. */
#if WORDSIZE == 64 && defined WORDSIZE COMPAT32
                          /* Session ID (getsid(2)), used for windowing */
  int32 t ut session:
  struct {
                        /* Seconds */
    int32 t tv sec;
    int32 t tv usec;
                         /* Microseconds */
  } ut tv;
                     /* Time entry was made */
#else
  long ut_session;
                        /* Session ID */
  struct timeval ut tv;
                          /* Time entry was made */
#endif
                           /* Internet address of remote host; IPv4 address uses just ut addr v6[0] */
  int32 t ut addr v6[4];
                           /* Reserved for future use */
  char unused[20];
};
```

Altering history files and defense


- /home/user/.shellName_history
 - Stores the 500 last entered commands
 - However the last commands are not written until shell is exited
 - Kill the current shell instead of logout
 - /home/user/ may have some other history dirs/files as .mc/ .lesshst etc.
- Activate logging
 - Not a problem in Unix/Linux logrotate
 - Rotate, compress (and mail logs), run as a daily cron job
 - Windows XP most is off
 - Windows default is 512kB change in Event Viewer properties
 - Needs thorough auditing review in security policy settings
- Additional log file protection
 - Proper permissions, append only, encrypted...
 - http://www.coresecurity.com/ Corelabs > Open Source Projects > MSyslog
 - Separate secured logging server with local logging still on
 - Attached log box (no network) or write once media as DVD-R

MicroSoft Log Parser (free)

- As an application developer you often need to write some logs for your application
 - There is many logging framework to choose among: Log4net, Log4j, Microsoft Logging Application Block, etc.
 - But when it come to read those logs, search for data, create reports, extract statistics or perform some alert/action on them, things become harder
- Log Parser performs SQL queries against a variety of log files and other system data sources
 - You can query any log and data sources (database, event log, IIS logs, file system, registry, etc.) with a complex SQL query!
 - On the down side, using it from the command line become quickly unpractical as you need to type your SQL query in a DOS prompt
 - logparser -i:EVT "SELECT TOP 20 * FROM Security WHERE EventID=5032 ORDER BY TimeGenerated DESC" -o DATAGRID
 - logparser -i:W3C -o:DATAGRID "SELECT RowNumber, date, time, action, protocol, src-ip, dst-ip, src-port, dst-port FROM C:\cases\pfirewall.log WHERE dst-port IN (80; 443) ORDER BY RowNumber"

Log Parser Architecture

- Swiss Army knife for processing Windows logs of all types (and others). The world is your database with Log Parser!
- Input Formats are generic record providers
 - Input Formats can be thought of as SQL tables containing the data you want to process
 - Manage .evtx files as well
- A SQL-Like Engine Core processes the records generated by an Input Format
 - SQL language (SELECT, WHERE, GROUP BY, HAVING, ORDER BY etc.)
 - Aggregate functions (SUM, COUNT, AVG, MAX, MIN etc.)
 - A rich set of functions (e.g. SUBSTR, CASE, COALESCE, REVERSEDNS, etc.)
- Output Formats are generic consumers of records
 - They can be thought of as SQL tables that receive the results of the data processing
 - BSD syslog protocol, RFC 3164



Log Parser Lizard

http://www.lizard-labs.net/log_parser_lizard.aspx

Save Save Input Log	Query Run operties Query Grid Top 10 largest files - Top 10 largest files EXTRACT_PATH(Path) d\apps d\apps	Image: System System Image: System EXTRACT_FILENAME(Path) OOo_3.3.0_Win_x86_install_en-US.exe eclipse-java-helios-SR2-win32-x86_64.zip	136 99	10 largest files - File System 136		
	d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps\ida-pro d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps d:\apps	jdk-6u25-windows-x64.exe ActivePython-2.7.1.4-win64-x64.msi jre-6u25-windows-x64.exe thebat_pro_4-2-36-4.rar idafree50.exe KillDiskSuiteFree-Setup.exe FoxitReader431_enu_Setup.exe converter.exe	67 42 16 15 15 11 7 7 5	122.9 109.8 96.7 83.6 70.5 57.4		
IIS Logs Event Logs Active Directory				44.3 31.2 18.1		
Log4Net File System	Query ->> SELECT TOP 10 EXTRACT_PATH(Path), EXTRACT_FILENAME(Path), DIV(Size, 1048576) 1 SELECT TOP 10 EXTRACT_PATH(Path), EXTRACT_FILENAME(Path), DIV(Size, 1048576) 2 FROM d:\apps*.* ORDER BY DIV(Size, 1048576) DESC					
T-SQL	Image: Weight of the system Image: Weight of the system Input records: 0, Output records: 0, Rows in table: 10 File System					
Opyright (C) 2006-2010 Lizard Labs		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			www.lizard-labs.net	

SQALP (Simple Query Analyzer for Log Parser)

	Query View Tool						
	🗿 🖾 EVT			-			
	Untitled 2* Untitled 3	Charles 1	4 Þ 🗙	Examples			
2 FROM · Ap 3 WHERE · E	RecordNumber, TimeG plication ventID=8194 AND Sou ventID=8194 AND Sou ventID=8194 AND Sou	rceName='VSS' 9	Î	EVT Input Format Examples			
	echo off	alternative (%filename% in sql)	ш	Create an XML report file containing logon account names an dates from the Security Event Log:			
	01	e -i:W3C file:WinFW.sql? cases\pfirewall.log -o:DATAGRID	•	LogParser "SELECT TimeGenerated AS LogonDate, EXTRACT TOKEN(Strings, 0, ' ') AS Account INTO Report.xml FROM Security WHERE EventID NOT IN (541;542;543) AND EventTime = 8 AND EventCorcory = 2"			
(III	•	🔗 FROM entry 🛃 Fields 🛃 Parameters 🛃 Examples			
lesults				EVT parameters			
RecordNumber	TimeGenerated	Message					
6489	2009-05-08 13:15:32	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f	or the IV				
5886	2009-05-05 17:13:24	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
5816	2009-05-05 16:23:41	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
5708	2009-05-05 10:28:17	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
5705	2009-05-05 10:26:53	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
4829	2009-04-16 09:42:28	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
4737	2009-04-15 20:05:55	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error guerying f		C UT			
4734	2009-04-15 20:05:19	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying for the TVssWriterCallback interface. hr = 0x80					
4594	2009-04-13 02:07:46	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying		/ssWriterCallback interface, hr = 0x80 msgErrorMode M			
4590	2009-04-12 23:45:07	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f		/ssWriterCallback interface, hr = 0x80			
4587	2009-04-12 23:43:30	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error guerying f		etringeSen			
4004	2009-03-31 02:07:05	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error guerying f					
3928	2009-03-29 13:34:42	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f					
3904	2009-03-28 13:11:06	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error querying f		/eeW/riterCallback interface br - 0x80			
	2009-03-28 13:08:54	Volume Shadow Copy Service error: Unexpected error guerying f		binarytormat			
3901							


MicroSoft Log Parser, events etc.

- Log Parser download
 - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/scriptcenter/to ols/logparser/default.mspx
- Visual Log Parser GUI (SQALP) ۲

http://en.serialcoder.net/logiciels/visual-logparser.aspx

- Log Parser user forum
 - www.logparser.com
- Book with loads of scripts and queries ۲ http://www.elsevierdirect.com/companion.jsp?ISBN=9781932266528
- Microsoft log events
 - http://eventlogs.blogspot.com
 - http://eventid.net (what does it mean?)
- Forensic Log Parsing with Microsoft's Log Parser
 - http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1712

"Mastering Windows Network Forensics and Investigation" have a good tutorial as well!



Including Gabriele Giuseppini, Developer of Microsoft Log Parser.

 Analyze the Log Files from Windows Server, Snort IDS, NetMon, IIS Server, Exchange Server, and More

Web Site Provides Hundreds of Original, Working Scripts to Automate Tasks


Step-by-Step Instructions for Using Log Parser to Data Mine All Your Logs

Gabriele Giuseppini Software Design Engineer, Microsoft Corporation

Mark Burnett Microsoft Windows Server MVP for IIS

Log2timeline - http://log2timeline.net/


- A framework for automatic creation of a super timeline. The main purpose is to provide a single tool to parse various log files and artifacts found on suspect systems (and supporting systems, such as network equipment) and produce a timeline that can be analysed by forensic investigators/analysts
- The tool is written in Perl for Linux but has been tested using Mac OS X (10.5.7+ and 10.6.+). Parts of it should work natively in Windows as well (with ActiveState Perl installed)
- "Mastering the Super Timeline With log2timeline" can be downloaded here
 - http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/logging/mastering-super-timelinelog2timeline_33438



SIMILE: http://www.simile-widgets.org/timeline/

Microsoft System Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 and Syslog (RFC 3164) alternatives

- Microsoft System Center Operations Manager är ett händelse- och prestandaövervakningsverktyg som innehåller en mängd funktioner för att reducera den tid det tar att konfigurera ett system eller en tillämpning
- Course and other white papers
 - http://www.microsoft.com/systemcenter/operationsmanager/en/us/default.aspx
- End-to-End Service Monitoring
- Client Monitoring
- Audit Collection
- GNU/Linux setup
 - http://www.aboutdebian.com/syslog.htm
- Other (Windows) Syslog servers
 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syslog
- Convert Windows log to Syslog
 - http://www.syslogserver.com
- Setting up Syslog to redirect logging to separate log server is very easy




Hiding files and directories

- Unix/Linux
 - '.' = current directory, '..' = parent directory (already present)
 - '.' and different combinations hides files and folders
 - Ex. [dot] [dot] [space] or [dot] [dot] [dot] etc.
 - Is -al check "man Is" for more options
- Windows
 - Hidden attribute
 - ADS stream (only NTFS)
 - Create: C:\tmp>type malware.exe > my.txt:hidden-malware.exe omitting "my.txt" attach ADS stream to the tmp folder instead
 - Restore: C:\tmp>more < my.txt:hidden-malware.exe > malware.exe
 - Run: C:\tmp>start .\my.txt:hidden-malware.exe
 - Other places
 - C:\System Volume Information, System.sav and Recycler folders
 - MSOCache and other obscure hidden places
 - Hide protected operating system files
 - Metasploit MAFIA
 - Slacker tool
- Make sure AV and other scan tools are ADS aware
 - Otherwise same defense as with rootkits etc.

Covert channels I

- Hide data on the network
- Installed via
 - Some vulnerability
 - E-mail trojan
 - Ex-employee
 - Contractor or temp
 - Physical break-in
- Port redirection
- Tunneling



- Allows encapsulation of any protocol within another enabling authorized data streams to carry arbitrary data
- SSH forward and reverse tunnels, SSL wrapping via Stunnel
- HTTP tunneling and third party VPN services
- http://www.chrisbrenton.org/2009/08/top-5-firewall-threats/

Port redirection with rinetd etc.

- Port redirection involves accepting traffic on a network interface, on a specific port, and redirecting it to a different IP address/port. This ability can be useful in several situations
- Imagine you are at a office which is protected by a firewall with strict outbound rules, allowing only outbound traffic on port 80 (no content inspection)
- You are an IRC addict and must constantly be connected to your favourite IRC server in order maintain your mental health :)
- On your home computer you can listen on port 80 and redirect any incoming traffic to to the IRC server at port 6667
- There are several port redirectors for Windows as FPipe and WinRelay. Unix got the internet redirection server Rinetd, which is present in BackTrack
- We can configure Rinetd using /etc/rinetd.conf


allow 192 168 2 * Home pc # deny 192.168.2.1 :80 sshd/rinetd # forwarding rules come here # bindaddress bindport connectaddress connectport Servidor/PC cmd/ssh 130.64.228.230 80 irc.freenode.net 6667 Intermediario # logging information Router/Módem IRC Meg@red Seguridad logfile /var/log/rinetd.log Meg@red

:6667

Externa

Port forward SSH tunnel Dynamic and Local

- SSH tunnel sessions manage to encrypt traffic and create bidirectional channels which can be used to forward local and remote connections
- This feature allows one to do seemingly impossible TCP/UDP traffic manipulations
 sshhome




Reverse port forward SSH tunnel

Remote server is forwarded to local client

- Let's say we have an internal server which is only accessible to internal employees
- And we have an end user who wishes to expose this server to the Internet
- External
- ssh -p 80 user@ext.host.net
- Internal
- ssh -R 80:192.168.2.5:80
 user@ext.host.net

-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport

 Using 127.0.0.1 instead we could redirect traffic to a port on the internal client




Tunneling SSH over HTTP(S) and third party VPN

- Enables the user to run SSH connections over most HTTP and HTTPS proxy servers. Due to SSH features such as port forwarding, this can allow many types of services to be run safely over the SSH via HTTP connections
- Several proxy servers are supported & Apache via mod proxy
- Corkscrew and Proxytunnel can do this





- Third party VPN services allow end users to create an encrypted tunnel between their work system and systems on the Internet
- OpenVPN configured virtual servers are downloadable




Covert channels II

- Loki use ICMP as tunnel
 - All traffic is wrapped in ICMP payload field
 - Extracts the packets from the kernel
 - Port scans are futile
 - Also supports encryption and UDP port 53
- Others examples from: http://www.gray-world.net/
 - CCTT (The Covert Channel Tunneling Protocol)









Covert channels III

- Reverse WWW shell (as PassiveX)
 - Carry shell commands in standard HTTP GET messages
 - Victim appears to surf the web
 - Randomly polls the attacker for new commands to execute
 - Attacker appears to be a WWW server
 - Support even user/pass for the outgoing web proxy firewall
 - Similar to remote services as: https://www.gotomypc.com
- Other implementations
 - SMTP (slow)
 - FTP
 - Streaming
 Audio
 - TCP/CP (Carrier Pigeon) ☺




http://www.gotomypc.com/remote_access/re mote_access_technology



Even more covert channels I


- Mal/spy -ware using web browser
 - Piggyback IE using HTTP/HTTPS
 - BHO (Browser Helper Object)


- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_Helper_Object
- List BHOs: BHODemon and bho.pl (Windows Forensic Analysis)
- Using TCP and IP headers to carry data
 - Covert_TCP
 - Simple transfer of one char at a time using either one of the fields
 - IP ID (identification), usually used with fragmented packets...
 - TCP sequence number
 - Then RESET
 - TCP acknowledgment number
 - Used with bounce operation
 - Bounce operation
 - Spoofed source IP address
 - Send value of char-1 as ISNa
 - Works even if dest. port is closed on BNC (RESET have ISNa)



Even more covert channels II


- Noshu
 - Passive covert channel
 - Insert and peel data from ISNa during three-way handshake by other applications
 - Both victim and gateway must be under control!
 - Keep track of sequence numbers
- Defense
 - As usual no root/admin access
 - Hardened OS
 - Patched
 - Anti-virus and anti-spyware software
 - Unusual processes?
 - IDS systems as Snort





Steganography Techniques: Embedding in binary files

- Hiding info in images etc. in local files, web servers etc.
- Hydan
 - Exactly the same size and function but new hash sum
 - http://www.crazyboy.com/hydan/



Anatomy of an attack

- Most of the attacks is done with steps as in the CHR book according to author
 - -But there is a lot of difference depending on
 - Circumstances
 - Skill
 - Tools
 - Time etc.
- CHR book have three scenarios
- PDF from Handbok i IT-säkerhet

 lab2\netbios\bilaga_om_hackning.pdf

IP and TCP headers

Vers	rs Hlen Service Total Length								
Identification			Flags	Fragment Offset					
Time to	o Live	Protocol	Header (Checksum					
	Source IP Address								
	Destination IP Address								
		IP Options (if a	any)	Padding					
		Da	ata						
	Source Port Destination Port								
	Sequence Number								
Acknowledgment Number									
Hlen Rsvd Code Bits Window			dow						
Checksum Urgent Pointer									
		IP Options (if a	any) Paddir						
Data									